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bstract
n intended contribution to new thinking on an institution that seems to have lost memory of its origins and functions, conducted with the tools
f organization, law and economics. The argument shows how far we can go in reconceptualizing the firm as a democratic institution using only
fficiency and innovation arguments.
 2017 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublished by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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has been long, and took moment also in dedicated initiatives
that I promoted along all the 2000s, allowing discussions among
scholars with different backgrounds but similar concerns.1eywords: Economic democracy; Governance mechanisms; Theory of the firm
ntroduction
Governance is a central theme, if not ‘the’ grand theme in
ontemporary economic organization and management theory.
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080-2107/© 2017 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Admin
y Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (httmong all governance mechanisms and forms examined and
ssessed, though, the most important and celebrated device gov-
rning modern collective systems is almost never mentioned. A
emarkable blind spot indeed. Is democratic governance useless
n economic organization? What kind of entity the modern firm
s, or has become, that seems to float outside the basic rules of
ur selfcalling democratic societies? This essay pulls together
 series of studies and elaborations that, properly connected,
an give a threefold response to the above question: first, where
nd why democracy is actually a superior economic governance
ode; second, where and to what extent it is actually applied
more than it is acknowledged); and third, what some founding
eatures can be of a renewed theory of the firm that, in the course
f being scientifically more correct, is also more conducive to
ollective wellbeing and growth.
The approach is efficiency based, i.e. speaks the same lan-
uage of economic organization analysis (hence hopefully also
o organizational economists) and shows how far we can go
n justifying democratic governance before introducing any
otivational, ethical, or political consideration on the value of
articipation.
The itinerary bringing to the propositions summarized here1 Among the earliest initiatives, there has been the Bocconi Centennial Con-
erence on ‘Corporate governance and firm organization’, in 2002 roughly
oincident with the Enron scandal and published in an edited volume (Grandori,
004). Among the more recent events, there have been the Crora-Bocconi
istrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP. Published
p://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Democratic governance in modern economic entities is here
rgued to play a different role at an institutional and at an organi-
ational level, that, therefore, will be kept distinct in the analysis.
he ‘institutional level’ is meant to be that of what are the devices
hat ‘institute’ or ‘constitute’ an economic and juridical entity;
t is the level that in larger entities such as states is in fact called
constitutional’. What is the nature of the entity? How can it
ome into existence? What is the glue keeping it together? The
organizational level’, instead, refers to how decision rights and
bligations are ‘partitioned and coordinated’ within the entity.
emocratic governance plays a different role at the two levels
ecause, it will be argued, in a constitutional sense and at a con-
titutional level, all legally recognized entities are democracies
n modern societies, although the nature and number of the prin-
ipals in the democracy may vary (Grandori, 2015). The internal
rganization of an entity, instead, obeys to laws of internal and
xternal fit among organizational mechanisms, giving rise to
ifferent configurations, in which democratic mechanisms may
e more or less represented in different situations (Grandori &
urnari, 2008).
he  ﬁrm  as  democratic  institution
Suppose in the beginning there is no firm. Where does the
rm come from in the first place?
We can respond in two ways to this question, and in both ways
a rational reconstruction of) history helps. We can address the
ppearance of the firm as a species (a ‘form’ of economic organi-
ation) and as an individual subject (a firm getting established).
Firms are called ‘companies’ or ‘societies’ in law. Both terms
ome from the mother of all western law, i.e. Roman Law. They
oth indicated the formation of a ‘partnership’: ‘cum panis’
from which ‘company’) literally means ‘eating bread together’,
nd the Roman ‘societas’ was an agreement stipulated among
eople for the common use of a resource (Hansmann, Kraakman,
 Squire, 2006). Business historians have taught us that the first
tep beyond those simple ‘societas of people’ appeared in high
iddle Age and fluorished in Renaissance was taken with the
orm called ‘Commenda’: an agreement capable of associating
 variety of resources and dedicating them to a project in front of
ncertain results. Very close to what a ‘firm-like’ organization is
upposed to be: a ‘continued associations among co-specialized,
edicated assets, coordinated by conscious direction’ (Demsetz,
991). Which economic activities or problems initiated in that
eriod to which that kind of contract was a response? The
elatively new phenomenon was the undertaking of economic
rojects, as ‘silk route’ expeditions, involving a level of scale,
isk and uncertainty formerly experimented and reserved only
o states’ actions.
It has been observed that the features of those early agree-
ents are interestingly close to those used to establish firms
hink-Tank Day on ‘Democracy in and around economic organization’ in
eptember 2012; the Keynote panel at the EURAM Conference 2013 on
Democratizing Management’; the Special Panel on ‘The firm as a democratic
nstitution’ at the ISNIE Conference 2013.
e
(
c
k
(
p
t
a
qtração 52 (2017) 353–356
hen for conducting risky uncertain projects, like modern start
ps (Brouwer, 2005): investments of assets that differ in kind
nto a new entity, and residual reward and decision rights shared
y the different types of investors (the entrepreneur investing
ainly the project and knowledge assets, and actors like financial
ngels and venture capitalists investing mainly money).
Hence, the birth of the firm, intended both as ‘the invention
f the enterprise’ as a species and as the establishment of a sin-
le firm, is founded on the use of a partnership-like agreement
Landes et al., 2010); that in the Civil Law systems closer to the
oman inheritage, as Europe and Latin America, in fact called
contract of societas’ (Società/Sociètè/Sociedad/Gesellshaft)
Grandori, 2010). The essential ingredient of such an agreement
s the establishment of a third juridical person, different from the
ocii, into which assets can be invested and dedicated to a proj-
ct (without exposing to risk all other investors’ assets), while
esource providers stipulate to share results without knowing
hem ex-ante in amount or even in kind.
That’s the glue. No power, no hierarchy, not even necessarily
ny ‘pooling of technical assets’ (all assets can be immaterial)
or any ‘employment relation’ (there might be no employees)
re necessary ingredients for establishing a firm and keeping it
ogether; but an agreement in which a ‘societas’ is established,
n which all the socii are principals. Given that assets become
roperty of the societas (the firm), and what the socii have and
hare are residual rewards rights, a further complementary mech-
nism, is necessary for the contract to be acceptable: a sort of
constitution governing the on-going cooperation’ (Goldberg,
976). In other terms, it is necessary to establish who has the
ight to decide, as things evolve. How can those rights be ‘shared’
mong multiple actors?
What counts is who votes (Hansmann, 1988): the core mech-
nism for sharing decision rights among a set of principals is
emocracy – direct or representative, simple or weighted. That
s the sense in which ‘all companies are democracies’ (Grandori,
015) (and an efficiency rationale for modern organizational
aw, prescribing that any legally recognized association should
e governed in a democratic mode). And that’s why, I think,
ansmann (1988) once said that ‘corporations are cooperatives
f lenders’. True, in the sense that both establish societies to be
overned by some democratic way of forming decisions. Prob-
bly false, however, in the sense that the difference between
oting rights attached to heads or weighted by the amount of
nvested resources (attached to shares) is not trivial. A constitu-
ion may be democratic but voting procedures and the identity
f principals can make a huge difference (Masten, 2013).
As to voting procedures, it may seem that one-head-one-vote
ystems (characterizing the constitution of cooperative firms for
xample) are more democratic than one share-one-vote systems
essential feature of corporations). Nevertheless, if by demo-
ratic governance we mean a fair system of representation of
nowledge and interests (at an acceptable decision process cost)
Buchanan & Tulloch 1962), in an economic endeavors where
arties invest resources, a representative system that is not linked
o the relative value of the resource provided is likely to be unfair
nd unsustainable (Grandori, 1991; Lammers, 1993). The key
uestion for designing a fair representation system, even more
ministração 52 (2017) 353–356 355
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Table 1
Average scores of democratic and other mechanisms, in high and low performing
major Italian firms.
Market-like Bureaucratic Communitarian Democratic
High efficiency 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.1
High innovation 2.8 2.1 2.7 2.1
Low efficiency 1.4 2.5 2.1 1.0
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han the voting procedure, is which type of resources providers
re represented, namely the identity of the principals and the
idth of the society. Who should be principal and why? What
re the efficient boundaries of a societas?.
I found the study of new firms most enlightening in this
espect. In fact, what regularly happens in those settings, is that
omeone investing millions in money gets a minority of shares,
hile someone investing little sums of money but providing the
roject on which the firm is based owns a majority of shares. How
an it be? The point is that knowledge assets become property
f the firm (they are not subject to be withdrawn at will, as prop-
rty right theorists typically claim) (Hart, 1995); and the human
apital investor gets property rights in the firm in exchange, as
ny investor should. This argument implies that all investors of
ny kind of resource, in particular investors of human capital in
mall or large amounts, should be entitled property rights in the
rm, in proportion to their investment (Grandori, 2013). Should
uch a principle, and incentive to invest, be applied the bound-
ries of the society of principals would be significantly enlarged
ith respect to current practices. Further expansions of the set
f principals would ensue by the application of other organi-
ational effectiveness and economic efficiency criteria such as:
llocating decision rights (also of residual kind) to the actors who
now best what the best actions are, and hold critical knowledge
ssets (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Aoki, 2010; Grandori, 2016);
nd allocating residual reward rights to all actors whose comple-
entary resources, specific and general, contribute to generate
he firm surplus (or quasi-rent) (Aoki, 1984).
In sum enterprises, even according to existing laws, are in fact
emocratic institutions, but like in Athen’s democracy, the prob-
em is that the boundaries of the societas, the set of principals,
re usually too narrowly defined.
emocratic  coordination  mechanisms
It has become common to say that firms ‘are’ hierarchies. In
pite of the rethorical success of the markets versus hierarchies
pposition, strictu sensu the opposition is logically unsatisfac-
ory and empirically counter-factual. While the statement that
he large industrial enterprises of the last century tended to be
rganized in a hierarchical way is empirically supported by
bservation; we can also observe many entities that are firms
o not employ hierarchy; as much as many entities that are not
rms employ hierarchy extensively. Hierarchy in fact is not an
nstitution, which is always multi-mechanism, as a market is.
ierarchy is just a coordination mechanism that can be employed
n any entity, and actually also across entities (Grandori, 1997;
ennart, 2013). Democratic institutions also make a large use
f hierarchy, from political parties to the state itself.
Assuming that companies or societas are democratic societies
t the institutional level, a different question is to what extent
emocratic coordination mechanisms, based on joint decision
aking, are applied at the organizational level; with respect toentral hierarchical decision making, and to still other possible
oordination mechanisms (as rules and routines for example).
For an organization to work, all those mechanisms need to
resent to a certain extent. This is old wisdom in organization
2
m
a
mow innovation 1.4 2.5 2.0 1.3
esign theory (Galbraith, 1974; Thompson, 1967) and social
heory (Fiske, 1992). Recently, a series of configurational stud-
es, based on quantitative data from questionnaires, provided
upport to that traditional idea, enriched by a specific enquiry
nto the application of democratic mechanisms as a separate
lass of organizational practices (Grandori & Furnari, 2008,
013). In those studies, four classes of organizational practices
ave been considered: ‘Market-like’ (e.g. pay for performance,
nternal labor market flexibility); ‘Bureaucratic’ (e.g. degree of
ertical and horizontal partitioning of structure, formal deci-
ion, control and HRM rules and procedures); ‘Communitarian’
e.g. knowledge sharing, team work); and ‘Democratic’ (e.g.
iffusion of property rights and representation rights in ruling
odies; task self-determination rights). The operationalization
f democratic mechanisms in those studies, included both an
rganizational component of empowerment, job enrichment and
articipation, and a measure of what we have called the boundary
f the societas, i.e. how diffused the allocation of property rights
s. Each class was composed by 4 practices and the presence
f each practice measured as a 0–1 dummy; hence the inten-
ity of market-like, bureaucratic, communitarian and democratic
echanisms could vary from 0 to 4. The sample consisted in 80
alid questionnaires received from a contacted population of the
argest 500 Italian firms in 2006. Through Qualitative Compara-
ive Analysis techniques, we enquired into which combinations
f those practices or mechanisms made a difference in observing
or not observing) above average performance in terms of inno-
ation and efficiency indicators. We provide here some specific
laborations on this data base, presented in various conferences
nd circulated in Research Reports but published only in Italian
n this format (Grandori, 2015), that are specifically useful to
ighlight the role of democratic practices (Table 1).
The interesting result emerging is that, while bureaucratic and
ommunitarian mechanisms are widely applied both in high and
ow performing firms, what makes a difference are democratic
as well as ‘market-like’) kinds of mechanisms: there is a deficit
n their application in low performing firms with respect to high
erforming firms. Even more interesting, is the result that the
resence of democratic governance mechanisms has positive
ffects not only on innovation but also on efficiency. In fact, that
emocratic organizational and HR practices are fit to knowledge
ntensive activities and innovation is more intuitive and analyzed
Lepak, Scott, & Snell, 2002; Miles et al., 1997; Osterloh & Frey,
006; Rajan & Zingales, 2000). The incidence of such practices
ay be prevalent with respect to that of other mechanisms, to
n extent that the whole organizational configuration or ‘form’
ay be qualified as a democracy. Thus conceived, democracy
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Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (2000). The governance of the new enterprise. In56 A. Grandori / Revista de Ad
rovides a fourth organizational alternative, next to the tradi-
ional forms of market, bureaucracy and clan (Ouchi, 1980) fit
o conditions where those other forms are known to fail: the
overnance of differentiated interests and knowledge, coupled
ith high task complexity and uncertainty (Grandori, 2016).
y contrast, under what conditions, what kind of democratic
echanisms, at what level of intensity, can contribute to organi-
ational efficiency where tasks are simpler and not knowledge
ntensive is a much less addressed topic, at least in recent times;
nd should rank high in the agenda for future research.
oncluding  remarks
The study of ‘organizational alternatives’ should rank high
n the research agenda, particularly because the recent times
ave been troubled times of economic crisis (AMP Symposium,
016). The above argument and studies contributed to an emerg-
ng critical rethinking on the nature of firm and its governance,
iming at correcting the trends in the opposite direction that
ave occurred in practice, and that may well have significantly
ontributed to the crisis: verticalization of power, increasingly
nequal and unproductive distribution of surplus, loss of sight of
he functions of firms as a different person with respect to finan-
ial investors, increasing disregard toward the contribution of
abor and transfer of firm risk to collaborators, narrowing down
f the boundaries of citizenship in the firm ‘societas’. Therefore
imes are more than ripe for revitalizing the study of how the
emocratic governance of economic institutions can sustain not
nly innovation, but also efficiency and growth.
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